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. L Control No.: . 10-J 31-18 BMT 
Roberto Paulino, 16-R-1461 
Watertown CF 
23147 Swan Road , 
Watertown, NY 13601-9340 
October 2018 hold to Parole Eligibility Date. 
I 
Berliner, Davis 
Appellant's Brief received December 10, 2018 
Appeals ~nit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
1.: 'I ' 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence ;fnyes~\~ation Report, PE!!ole .Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Releas~ Decisi9h Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
/ 
he-undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ ____;-AU::...mt-~~'--'-'-"~rmed _· _ Vac~ted, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
i.:::::::="~~~~~:.-::;~~~med l _ Va~ated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to--- -
~cmed _Vacated, remanded· for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recomm~mdation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the relatec(:S~a~emynt of the Appeals U:i;iit's Findings and the se~pte }1;_dings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were ma ilecf to· thei;~nmate and thei{nmate' s Counsel, if any, on , j/ I/, '/14 ~6 . .. ' . . ,. , 
'· ~ : {' 'I ' , • ~ ' 
f)istrihut ion: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - lnst. Parole Fik - Central File 
P-2002(8 > ( l I 11018) 
• t 
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Appellant was sentenced to four years, three months, 10 days to give years upon his 
conviction of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the third degree.  He was on lifetime 
parole at the time.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of 
the Board denying discretionary release on parole on the following grounds: (1) the decision 
violates the Executive Law because the Board failed to consider and/or fairly consider all required 
factors; (2) the decision is arbitrary and capricious because the Board focused on Appellant’s 
criminal history over his accomplishments and other factors and resentenced him; (3) the Board 
improperly ignored Appellant’s receipt of merit time and an EEC; (4) the Board denied Appellant 
a fair interview and issued a predetermined decision; (5) the Board failed to comply with Executive 
Law § 259-c(4) by utilizing risk assessment principles and procedures; and (6) the decision fails 
to provide adequate details.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
Generally, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted unless the Board determines that 
an inmate meets three standards: “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he 
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with 
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  The Board must 
consider factors relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Whereas here the 
inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  
Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 
N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 
502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d 
Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  An EEC does not 
automatically guarantee release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors, including the 
instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 
N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 
1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 
N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).   
 
While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
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v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Corley, 
33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that 
the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its 
duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 
(3d Dept. 1990). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant drug offense committed while on parole; Appellant’s 
criminal history including two prior terms for drug convictions and multiple parole violations; his 
institutional record including vocational programming, completion of  receipt of merit time 
and an EEC, and clean discipline; his immigration status and history of returning to the United 
States after deportation in the past; and  
.  The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the 
sentencing minutes, Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and letters of support. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining 
release would not satisfy the applicable standards for release.  In reaching its conclusion, the Board 
permissibly relied on Appellant’s criminal record including his parole history and that he was on 
parole at the time of the instant offense, Appellant’s deportation history, and elevated scores in the 
COMPAS instrument.  See, e.g., Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 
715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 
N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014). 
 
That the Board emphasized Appellant’s criminal record over other factors does not render 
the decision arbitrary and capricious.  Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 
(3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d 
Dept. 2013).  Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to a resentencing 
also is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of 
release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  
Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 
N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole 
Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with 
discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of 
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incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 
(3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 
2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner 
been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the record reflects the Board considered his receipt of merit 
time and an EEC.  However, an EEC does not automatically guarantee release or eliminate 
consideration of the statutory factors.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d at 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 818.   
Appellant’s receipt of an EEC did not preclude the Board from placing greater emphasis on his 
criminal behavior and parole history and denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 
149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Berry v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 50 A.D.3d 1346, 855 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2008); see also Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 
31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 
N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 
775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001).  Like an EEC, 
merit time does not automatically guarantee release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the inmate’s criminal behavior.  See, e.g., Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 
342 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 
988 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (3d Dept. 2014). 
 
The transcript as a whole does not support Appellant’s contention that the parole interview 
was conducted improperly or that he was denied a fair interview.  Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 
A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Mays v. Stanford, 55 N.Y.S.3d 
502, 150 A.D.3d 1521 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 
A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006).  There also is no evidence the Board’s 
decision was predetermined.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 
(3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 
N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 
695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). 
Appellant’s additional contention that the Board failed to comply with Section 259-c(4) of the 
Executive Law is likewise without merit.   That provision requires procedures incorporating risk 
and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 
259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
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Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
However, the COMPAS was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board 
gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the 
interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board 
conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the 
instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the applicable standards are satisfied.  See Matter of 
Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); 
accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is 
exactly what occurred here. 
 
Finally, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the 
denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).  
The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and 
explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations: namely, the appellant’s 
criminal record and parole history, his deportation history and elevated scores in the COMPAS 
instrument. 
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
